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Abstract
We study the effects of a rural electrification program on employment in Peru. Taking
advantage of the program’s roll-out across districts over time, we adopt
differences-in-differences and fixed-effects strategies to estimate the impact of
electrification on labor market outcomes. Our preferred specification suggests that,
among males, the program increases hours of work and diminishes the likelihood of
having a second occupation. Among females, the treatment raises employment and
earnings and increases the probability of working outside the agricultural sector.
JEL codes: J22; O13
Keywords: Electrification; Employment; Peru
1 Introduction
Access to public services and infrastructure such as water (Devoto et al. 2012; Sekhri
2014), roads (Banerjee et al. 2012), electricity (Dinkelman 2011; Rud 2012; Libscomb et
al. 2013) and telecommunications (Goyal 2010; Beuermann 2011; Beuermann et al. 2012)
seems to be key to generate welfare improvements in rural areas. Many governments in
developing countries allocate large amounts of money to finance infrastructure projects
as an attempt to boost economic development in poor areas. The growing empirical lit-
erature on this topic has documented that such public projects have positive effects on
the welfare of rural households by allowing them to have access to markets, jobs and
information.
In this study, we evaluate the impacts of electrification on employment in rural Peru. In
2006, only 39 percent of rural households had access to electricity. However, the Peruvian
government rapidly increased electricity coverage during the last decade through the Pro-
grama de Electrificación Rural, known as PER (for its acronym in Spanish). Rural families
largely depend on the labor market to meet their consumption plans, so we focus on the
impacts of electrification on employment.
Electricity provision can affect labor outcomes through different channels. First, it can
be thought of as a technological shock that improves household production. Second,
it implies a larger time endowment because everyone can work during the night (and
not only during the day). Third, it could promote the start of new businesses by allow-
ing households to produce goods and services that require appliances. Fourth, it might
increase the time spent watching TV (Olken 2009).
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Since the theoretical prediction of access to electricity on labor supply is ambiguous, we
empirically examine the total effect of electrification on different employment outcomes
in Peru. Two previous studies analyze the association between access to electricity and
hours of work in Peru (Escobal 2005; Torero et al. 2007). Based on matching techniques,
both papers find that households with electricity work more hours in non-farm activities
than families without electricity. However, it is likely that unobservable differences remain
even after controlling for observable characteristics. Using data from other developing
countries, fourmore recent papers deal better with the fact that electricity is not randomly
assigned to households.
First, Dinkelman (2011) estimates the impact of electricity provision in rural areas
of South Africa during 1990-2007. She takes advantage of the roll-out of an electrifi-
cation program done by ESKOM, the electricity utility. Between 1993 and 2003, about
470,000 households were electrified. Program placement was not random so the author
uses community level data and relies on instrumental variables and fixed-effects strate-
gies to uncover their parameters of interest. In particular, she uses land gradient as an
instrument for program placement and then adopts a fixed-effects estimator to remove
time-invariant unobservables that may jointly affect program placement and employ-
ment. Her results indicate that electrification leads to an increase in female employment
in both the extensive and intensive margin and that women’ s wages fall while male
earnings go up.
Second, Rud (2012) evaluates the link between electricity provision and industrializa-
tion in India during the period 1965-1984. To overcome endogeneity concerns, he uses
the start of the Green Revolution, an agricultural technology intensification in irriga-
tion introduced in the 1960s as a natural experiment. In particular, he predicts electricity
expansion using (initial) groundwater availability in the 1960s. The author documents that
an increase in electrification provision is associated with gains in manufacturing output.
He also finds that places with higher access to electricity have more factories and output
among small firms.
Third, Libscomb et al. (2013) analyze the effects of electrification on the Human
Development Index (HDI) using county-level data from Brazil. The authors also rely
on geographic characteristics to adopt an IV approach. More specifically, they simulate
how the electricity grid would have evolved if its expansion had only taken into account
geographic cost considerations (water flow and river gradient), ignoring demand-side
considerations. Then, they use this forecast as an instrument for actual program place-
ment. Their results indicate that electricity provision is associated with higher levels of
HDI. Moreover, their analysis suggests that migration is unlikely to account for the large
magnitude of development gains observed. They also estimate large, positive effects of
electrification on employment, salaries, and investments in education, but not health.
Fourth, Grogan and Sadanand (2013) use several methods to analyze the association
between household electricity and time use in Nicaragua. Using past population density
as an instrument for current access to electricity, they find that access to electricity makes
women – but not men – more likely to work outside home.
Our paper adds to this literature by using individual-level data instead of aggregate
data. Also, we have detailed information on labor outcomes that allow us to iden-
tify the channels through which electrification affects employment. In the absence of
an experimental design, our approach consists of using two identification strategies:
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Differences-in-Differences and Fixed-Effects. For the former, we use seven repeated
cross-sections of the Peruvian household survey during the period 2006-2012. For the
latter, we utilize a unique household panel data set collected between 2007 and 2010.
We document the following impacts of the program on labor outcomes. Our preferred
specification suggests that men in treated areas reallocate their time devoted to work as
follows: they work harder (2.5 additional hours per week) in their main occupation but
are less likely to have a second job (a reduction of 6 percentage points). Among women,
our estimates indicate that treatment increases earnings and hourly wages by around 30
percent. Additional evidence suggests that these gains are related to a lower probability of
working in agriculture. Since male earnings are unaffected, these estimates imply that the
program has reduced the gender wage gap in treated districts. These findings represent
our contribution to the literature that examines the role of electricity provision on labor
markets in developing countries.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the electrification pro-
gram and our data sources. Section 3 outlines the empirical strategies. Section 4 presents
our results. Section 5 offers concluding remarks.
2 The program and data sources
2.1 The electrification program
In 1993, the Peruvian Ministry of Energy and Mining launched the Rural Electrification
Program (PER, for its acronym in Spanish) as an attempt to foster social and economic
development in rural areas. The implementation of the program began after the enact-
ment of the “Act of Rural Electrification”. According to this Act, the main objective of PER
is to provide rural families with electricity, with the support of the private sector, public
institutions, and local governments.
The program placement was not random. Instead, the Ministry used the following set
of variables to identify eligible districts:
• Lower index of rural electrification (percentage of households with electricity)
• Higher poverty rate (percentage of households whose consumption is below the
poverty line)
• Lower proportion of the estimated subsidy per connection
• Lower cost per connection
• Higher use of renewable energy
Based on these dimensions, they defined the roll-out of the program. However, the pro-
gram did not expand according to these criteria because every time new data was released
(or new authorities got elected to work for theMinistry) the initial plans were changed. In
fact, theMinistry divided the PER in two sub-periods: 1993-2004 and 2005-2010. The first
sub-period was based on variables constructed using the population census from 1993.
The second sub-period used data from three sources: census 1993, census 2005, and the
country’s poverty map from 2007.
By the end of 2012, 628 electrification projects had been concluded throughout rural
Peru. To illustrate, we present the roll-out of the program during 2007-2010 in Figure 1.
The distribution of the projects according to its type is as follows: i) 55 transmission lines
with a length of 2,872 kilometers; ii) 299 rural electrical systems whose total length is
20,000 kilometers; iii) 268 hydro-power plants; iv) 4 projects that included the installation
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Figure 1 Implementation of the electrification program across districts. Authors’ calculations using
administrative data on electrification projects.
of 1,523 solar panels; and v) 2 wind-turbines. The Peruvian government has spent around
US$657.5 million on these projects. Once projects have been concluded, companies pro-
vide electricity to households upon paying for connection (and the subsequent electricity
bills). To get a sense of how large these costs are, Table 1 provides average monthly spend-
ing on electricity as a fraction of total expenditures across households. It is clear from the
figures that, in both control and treatment areas, spending on electricity represents only
a minor fraction of total spending.
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Table 1 Averagemonthly expenditures on electricity as a fraction of total household
expenditures
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
All districts 3.8% 4.8% 4.0% 4.1% 3.7% 4.2% 6.4%
Treated districts 2.8% 4.3% 4.2% 4.2% 3.4% 3.9% 4.2%
Non-treated districts 4.3% 5.2% 3.8% 4.1% 3.9% 4.4% 8.6%
Note: We use ENAHO cross-sections from 2006 to 2012 to estimate the average monthly expenditures as a fraction of total
expenditures across households, by area (treated and non-treated).
For the empirical analysis, we only use data on projects that were concluded in the
period 2007-2010.We do so for two reasons. First, because of rapid economic growth and
high political stability, most projects were concluded in this period (567 projects out of
628). Second, the National Office Statistics collected a unique household panel data set
during these same years.
2.2 Data sources
Our primary data source is the Encuesta Nacional de Hogares (henceforth, ENAHO)
conducted by the National Institute of Statistics on a yearly basis. This representative
household survey includes rich information on labor outcomes and other individual char-
acteristics. In the Differences-in-Differences (DD) approach, we pool repeated annual
cross-sections for the period 2006-2012. In the Fixed Effects (FE) strategy, we use a unique
household panel data set collected between 2007-2010, using a random sub-sample of the
cross-section from 2007.
The dependent variables are taken from ENAHO’s employment record (in which all
individuals over 14 years old are interviewed). We construct nine labor market outcomes
for the empirical analysis: i) participation; ii) employment; iii) hours of work; iv) log earn-
ings; v) log hourly wages; vi) whether the individual has two jobs; vii) whether he is a
wage-earner; viii) whether he works in agriculture; and ix) whether he is self-employed.
The vector of controls used in the DD approach is taken from ENAHO’s education record.
It includes characteristics such as maternal language, sex, age, and education level. We
also include an indicator variable for the presence of children below 5 in the household,
taken from the demographics record (see the Appendix for further details).
The list of electrification projects was taken from administrative records of theMinistry
of Energy and Mining. In our study period, 567 projects (out of 628) were concluded in
412 rural districts. For each electrification project, we observe the year of conclusion and
the treated districts (101 projects include more than one district).
Treated districts are defined as follows. We say that a district is treated by year t if at
least one project had been concluded in that year or earlier. Using unique district iden-
tifiers, year of interview and year of conclusion of each project, we match both data
sets. After doing so, our DD and FE samples include 246,735 and 12,964 individuals,
respectively.
Figure 2 shows the evolution of electricity coverage by area (treated and non-treated).
In both samples, we note that initial coverage was lower in treated areas than in control
districts, which is consistent with the criteria used by the Ministry. In the DD sample
(left panel), we see that treated areas experienced a rapid growth in access to electricity:
coverage went from 26 percent in 2006 to 67 percent in 2012. A similar expansion in
access to electricity is observed in the panel sample (right panel).
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Figure 2 Electricity coverage in rural Peru. Authors’ calculations using ENAHO. The DD sample includes
annual cross-sections from 2006 to 2012. The Panel sample goes from 2007 to 2010.
To show that the program led to higher electricity coverage, we regress actual access to
electricity at home on our treatment variable along with year fixed effects– and district
(individual) fixed-effects in the DD (panel) sample. Table 2 reports the corresponding
estimates for both samples. Both columns document the positive and highly significant
impact of the treatment on access to electricity: coverage in treated districts is roughly 8
percentage points higher than in control areas. Taken together, these results suggest that
our main independent variable is strongly correlated with actual access to electricity.
3 Empirical analysis
Since PER did not have an experimental design, any difference in outcomes between
treated and non-treated households would be a biased estimate of the effect of the pro-
gram (Angrist and Pischke 2009). To deal with unobserved confounders, we rely on two
non-experimental methods to estimate the impact of PER on labor outcomes. First, we
utilize repeated cross-sections and adopt a Differences-in-Differences (DD) approach.







N. of individuals 3,980
Note: Each column is a separate regression. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the individual’s household has electricity,
and 0 otherwise. Column (1) includes district and year fixed effects and standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the
district level. Column (2) includes individual and year fixed effects, and standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the
individual level.
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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Second, we use household panel data to apply a Fixed Effects (FE) estimation. In both
cases, non-treated and treated households would be referred to as the control and
treatment group, respectively. Each approach has its identifying assumptions and data
requirements which we describe with further detail in the next subsections. Given that
FE not only captures district-level unobservable characteristics but also individual-level
heterogeneity, we refer to it as our preferred specification.
3.1 Differences-in-differences (DD)
The DD approach exploits the roll-out of the program to remove permanent differences
across control and treated districts. That is, the DD estimator solves the problem of
endogenous program placement under the assumption that the selection bias is additive
and does not vary over time (Imbens and Wooldridge 2009).
To fix ideas, let i = 1, 2, . . . ,N , j = 1, 2, . . .M, and t = 1, 2, . . . ,T denote, individuals,
districts and years, respectively. This setup lead us to estimate the following equation:
yijt = αj + αt + βPERjt + X ′ijtγ + μijt , (1)
where yijt is the outcome variable (participation, hours of work, and so on); αj and αt
denote district and year fixed effects; PERjt indicates that the program arrived to district
j in year t; Xijt is a vector of individual characteristics (such as maternal language, educa-
tion, and so on). The error term is denoted by μijt and is allowed to be correlated across
individuals within districts. The parameter of interest is β . We should note that we fail to
identify which households are actually getting electricity at home. Therefore, we should
interpret β as the (overall) effect of providing electricity at the district level instead of
measuring the impact of actually receiving it.
The staggered implementation of PER allows us to include district fixed effects which,
among other things, capture geographic characteristics that are relevant to determine the
cost of each project (and therefore the placement of the program). The crucial assumption
to obtain consistent estimates is that, in the absence of the treatment, outcomes in treated
and control districts would have had parallel trends. Figures 3 and 4 provide graphical
evidence supporting this assumption. In particular, we present labor outcomes trends
(participation, employment, hours of work, and earnings) estimated using ENAHO cross-
sections from the (pre-treatment) period 1998-2005. Two features of the data are clear.
First, in both male and female samples, labor outcomes were lower in districts that were
treated between 2007-2010. This evidence is consistent with the criteria used by the Min-
istry to define the roll-out the program. Second, in all figures, trends were parallel before
the program. Thus, the parallel-trend assumption sounds plausible.
3.2 Fixed-effects (FE)
Rather than using repeated cross-sections, the FE approach requires following the same
individuals over time. The advantage of having panel data is that we can estimate the
following equation:
yijt = λi + λj + λt + ρPERjt + ηijt , (2)
where yijt is the dependent variable, λj and λt denote district and year fixed effects, PERjt
indicates that the individual lives in a district where at least one project has been con-
cluded by year t, and ηijt is the error term, which is allowed to be correlated within
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Figure 3 Males’ Labor outcomes trends during the pre-treatment period (1998-2005).Male sample.
Authors’ calculations using ENAHO cross-sections from 1998 to 2005. Between 1998-2002, ENAHO was
conducted only during the last quarter the calendar year. Only male individuals.
individuals across periods. The main difference with respect to equation (1) is the inclu-
sion of an individual fixed effect denoted by λi, which captures unobserved individual
heterogeneity. The price of doing so is that we cannot include individual controls that
do not vary over time such as district/year of birth, maternal language, sex, and educa-
tion. Recall that FE is our preferred specification because it is robust to the inclusion of
individual fixed effects.
Figure 4 Females’ Labor outcomes trends during the pre-treatment period (1998-2005). Female
sample. Authors’ calculations using ENAHO cross-sections from 1998 to 2005. Between 1998-2002, ENAHO
was conducted only during the last quarter the calendar year. Only female individuals.
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The key assumption to apply an FE strategy is that unobserved confounders are time-
invariant1. Given that program placement was determined by district characteristics that




We estimate equation (1) for each of our nine outcome variables, splitting the sample
by gender (following Dinkelman 2011, Grogan and Sadan 2013) in order to allow for
potentially different responses to electrification.
Table 3 shows our estimates of β from equation (1), the coefficient of interest, for male
individuals. In Panel A (top half of the table), we find that most point estimates are small
and statistically insignificant. The only statistically significant estimate – see column 6 –
suggests that the program reduces by 1.3 percentage points the probability of having two
jobs.
In Panel B, we exclude migrants from the analysis. We do so because the treatment may,
for instance, induce people to move from non-treated areas to treated districts, and this
systematic migration would bias our estimates. The estimated effects with this restricted
sample are very similar to those with all male individuals. This similarity may indicate
that migration should not be seen as a threat to the validity of our strategy.
In Table 4, we report the estimated effects of the program on female labor out-
comes. Our results indicate that electricity provision increases employment and hours
of work among females – columns 2 and 3 – and these estimates are fairly similar
across samples (Panel A and B). Though our reduced-form approach does not allow
us to distinguish demand shifts from supply shifts, the fact that wages remain con-
stant despite increases in employment, suggests that both curves are reacting to the
program.
4.2 FE Results
In this subsection, we report the estimates of ρ from equation (2), controlling for
unobserved individual heterogeneity. In Table 5, we present the point estimates for the
male sample. The program has statistically significant impacts on hours of work, the
likelihood of having two jobs and the probability of working in agriculture. The coef-
ficient in column 3 suggests that providing electricity increases males’ weekly hours
of work. A negative effect on the probability of having two jobs is shown in col-
umn 6: treated male individuals are 6 percentage points less likely to have two jobs
than men in the control group. This negative effect is larger than the point estimate
from the DD specification. Finally, the point estimate in column 8 reveals that the
program increases the probability of working in agriculture by 5 percentage points.
Overall, the FE estimates are larger in absolute terms than the DD estimates, and this
pattern may indicate that omitting unobserved individual heterogeneity (e.g., prefer-
ences for leisure) would bias DD estimates toward zero (and statistically insignificant
effects).
In Table 6, we show the effects of electrification on female labor market outcomes. We
notice interesting differences with respect to men. First, employment rates go up by 3.5














Table 3 Differences-in-differences estimates (DD) only men
Dependent (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
variable: Participation Employment Hours Log Log hourly Has Wage earner Works in Self-employed
of work earnings wage two jobs agriculture
Panel A: All men
PER -0.002 0.002 0.301 0.029 0.015 -0.013** -0.002 -0.001 -0.000
(0.004) (0.005) (0.265) (0.031) (0.029) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005)
Observations 125,098 125,098 125,098 49,346 47,721 125,098 92,766 125,098 125,098
R-squared 0.065 0.491 0.331 0.335 0.306 0.097 0.220 0.331 0.462
Panel B: Excluding migrants
PER 0.003 0.002 0.260 0.015 -0.000 -0.015** 0.001 0.000 0.003
(0.004) (0.006) (0.303) (0.038) (0.036) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005)
Observations 91,064 91,064 91,064 32,579 31,475 91,064 68,841 91,064 91,064
R-squared 0.080 0.506 0.345 0.312 0.301 0.111 0.195 0.350 0.502
Note: Standard errors clustered at the district level are shown in parentheses. Each coefficient comes from a separate regression. All dependent variables are binary except for hours, log (weekly) earnings, and hourly wages.
Individuals who do not work have zero (weekly) hours of work. Earnings and wages are only computed for those with positive values of income. PER is equal to one after the program arrives to a district, and zero otherwise.
All regressions control for presence of children below 5 in the household, individuals’ maternal language, age, and education, and district and year fixed effects. Panel A includes all men, and Panel B excludes migrants.
Migrants are defined as those who, by the time of the survey, live in a district different from their district of birth.














Table 4 Differences-in-differences estimates (DD) only women
Dependent (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
variable: Participation Employment Hours Log Log hourly Has Wage earner Works in Self-employed
of work earnings wage two jobs agriculture
Panel A: All women
PER 0.005 0.013** 0.671** 0.069 0.032 0.003 0.003 -0.000 0.007
(0.006) (0.006) (0.272) (0.049) (0.046) (0.005) (0.003) (0.007) (0.005)
Observations 121,637 121,637 121,637 24,233 23,746 121,637 104,830 121,637 121,637
R-squared 0.108 0.310 0.216 0.321 0.275 0.072 0.124 0.263 0.178
Panel B: Excluding migrants
PER 0.005 0.015** 0.581** 0.065 0.062 -0.001 0.003 0.003 0.002
(0.006) (0.007) (0.282) (0.059) (0.056) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006)
Observations 89,347 89,347 89,347 16,350 16,030 89,347 77,782 89,347 89,347
R-squared 0.120 0.342 0.244 0.322 0.290 0.081 0.113 0.278 0.197
Note: Standard errors clustered at the district level are shown in parentheses. Each coefficient comes from a separate regression. All dependent variables are binary except for hours, log (weekly) earnings, and hourly wages.
Individuals who do not work have zero (weekly) hours of work. Earnings and wages are only computed for those with positive values of income. PER is equal to one after the program arrives to a district, and zero otherwise.
All regressions control for presence of children below 5 in the household, individuals’ maternal language, age, and education, and district and year fixed effects. Panel A includes all women, and Panel B excludes migrants.
Migrants are defined as those who, by the time of the survey, live in a district different from their district of birth.














Table 5 Panel data estimates (FE) only men
Dependent (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
variable: Participation Employment Hours Log Log hourly Has Wage earner Works in Self-employed
of work earnings wage two jobs agriculture
PER -0.007 0.005 2.615*** -0.075 -0.090 -0.059*** -0.02 0.052*** 0.017
(0.013) (0.013) (0.885) (0.074) (0.081) (0.020) (0.017) (0.019) (0.014)
Observations 6,668 6,668 6,668 3,572 3,438 6,668 6,668 6,668 6,668
R-squared 0.0007 0.0018 0.0036 0.0229 0.0353 0.0043 0.0023 0.0046 0.0006
N. of individuals 2,052 2,052 2,052 1,410 1,402 2,052 2,052 2,052 2,052
Note: Standard errors clustered at the individual level are shown in parentheses. Each column is a separate regression. All dependent variables are binary except for hours, log (weekly) earnings, and hourly wages. Individuals
who do not work have zero (weekly) hours of work. Earnings and wages are only computed for those with positive values of income. All regressions control for year fixed effects. PER is equal to one after the program arrives to
a district, and zero otherwise. In this table, we restrict the sample to only men.














Table 6 Panel data estimates (FE) only women
Dependent (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
variable: Participation Employment Hours Log Log hourly Has Wage earner Works in Self-employed
of work earnings wage two jobs agriculture
PER 0.028 0.036* 0.869 0.360** 0.358** 0.001 0.014 -0.039* 0.046***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.850) (0.142) (0.143) (0.016) (0.013) (0.020) (0.017)
Observations 6,296 6,296 6,296 1,776 1,746 6,296 6,296 6,296 6,296
R-squared 0.0016 0.0014 0.0012 0.0363 0.0513 0.0035 0.0018 0.0017 0.0024
N. of individuals 1,938 1,938 1,938 883 876 1,938 1,938 1,938 1,938
Note: Standard errors clustered at the individual level are shown in parentheses. Each column is a separate regression. All dependent variables are binary except for hours, log (weekly) earnings, and hourly wages. Individuals
who do not work have zero (weekly) hours of work. Earnings and wages are only computed for those with positive values of income. All regressions control for year fixed effects. PER is equal to one after the program arrives to
a district, and zero otherwise. In this table, we restrict the sample to only women.
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
Dasso and Fernandez IZA Journal of Labor & Development  (2015) 4:6 Page 14 of 16
estimate. Second, providing electricity increases earnings and hourly wages by around 35
percent. Taken together, these two effects – more employment and higher wages – are
consistent with labor demand increasing more than labor supply. Third, the treatment
diminishes the likelihood of working in agriculture by almost 4 percentage points (which
is consistent with the findings of Escobal (2005) and Torero et al. (2007)). Fourth, women
in treated areas are more likely to be self-employed than their counterparts in the control
group. The differences between these figures and the DD results may suggest that control-
ling for individual fixed effects is relevant to obtain consistent estimates of the program
effects.
5 Concluding remarks
Governments in developing countries devote a significant share of their resources to
invest in public infrastructure. In fact, providing access to basic services such as water
sanitation, electricity, and telecommunications is one of the top priorities in their policy
agendas.
In this paper, we examine the labor market consequences of providing electrification
to rural households using individual-level data from Peru. To deal with the endogenous
placement of the electrification program, we adopt differences-in-differences (DD) and
fixed-effects (FE) strategies. We therefore assume that unobserved confounders are time-
invariant at the district and individual level, respectively.
The DD estimates indicate that the program only has modest effects on labor out-
comes: males seem to be less likely to have a second job, whereas females are more
likely to be employed and have higher hours of work. Our FE estimates suggest that,
among males, the treatment increases hours of work and decreases the likelihood of
having more than one job. One potential explanation for this result is that the elec-
trification program raises the benefits of specialization and therefore makes it less
attractive to have a second occupation. In other words, electricity increases available
time to work, and economies of scale increase the payoff of focusing on one occupa-
tion instead of having two. Among women, we document that employment and earnings
are higher in treated areas than in control districts. Interestingly, the program also
reduces the probability of working in the agricultural sector. Taken together, these pieces
of evidence imply that the program has reduced the gender wage gap among benefi-
ciaries.
Let us recall two limitations of our empirical analysis. First, the validity of our strategies
rests on the assumption that selection bias takes the form of unobserved time-invariant
characteristics. Second, our reduced-form estimates do not allow us to distinguish the
relative importance of demand-supply shifts. The increase in both female employment
and wages, however, may reflect that electrification increases labor demand more than
labor supply.
Future work should look at the impact of electrification on educational outcomes.
Access to electricity could be thought of as shock to school quality, which, in turn,
may affect the demand for education. Also, electrification could affect health outcomes
through better equipment at health centers or less demand for indoor polluting technolo-
gies (e.g., replacing wood/candles for electrical appliances/light-bulbs). Further research
on such outcomes would be important to understand the overall effect of electrification
on the lives of the rural poor.
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Endnote
1We distinguish the individual fixed effect from the district fixed effect only to
illustrate the main difference with respect to the DD approach. However, in practice,
they are not distinguishable because individuals in our panel do not migrate. Therefore,
the district of residence is captured in the individual fixed effect.
Appendix
• Dependent variables:
– Participation: equal to 1 if the individual is in the labor force, and equal to 0
otherwise
– Employed: equal to 1 if the individual is in employed, and equal to 0 otherwise
– Hours of work: Equal to the hours of work in the week previous to the
interview. It is zero for those who do not work.
– Log Earnings: weekly earnings are computed only for those who reported
positive values of income (dependent and independent workers). In-kind
payments are ignored.
– Log hourly wages: only computed for those who reported positive values of
income and non-zero hours of work.
– Has 2 jobs: equal to 1 if the individual has two jobs, and equal to 0 otherwise
– Wage-Earner: equal to 1 if the individual is a wage-earner, and equal to 0
otherwise
– Agriculture: equal to 1 if the individual works in agriculture, and equal to 0
otherwise
– Self-employed: equal to 1 if the individual is self-employed, and equal to 0
otherwise
• Control variables included in the DD specifications:
– Children: equal to 1 if there are children below 5 in the household, and 0
otherwise
– Maternal language: equal to 1 if the individual speaks Quechua, and 0
otherwise
– Sex: equal to 1 if the individual is male, and 0 otherwise
– Age: age of the individual at the year of interview (measured in years)
– Educational level dummies (no education, incomplete primary, complete
primary, incomplete secondary, and so on)
– District and year fixed effects
Abbreviations
PER: Rural Electrification Program; ENAHO: Encuesta Nacional de Hogares (Peruvian National Household Survey); DD:
Differences-in-Differences; FE: Fixed Effects.
Competing interests
The IZA Journal of Labor & Development is committed to the IZA Guiding Principles of Research Integrity. The authors
declare that they have observed these principles.
Acknowledgments
This paper updates and supersedes a previous version available as CEDLAS Working Paper N. 150, Oct. 2013. We are
indebted to Leonardo Gasparini for his invaluable guidance and support. We also thank David Lam (the editor), an
anonymous referee, Manuel Hernandez and Hugo Ñopo for very helpful comments on previous drafts. We gratefully
acknowledge financial support from the III Contest of Essays on Labor and Social Issues in Latin America - 2013, jointly
organized by CEDLAS (UNLP-Argentina) and IDRC (Canada).
Responsible editor: David lam
Dasso and Fernandez IZA Journal of Labor & Development  (2015) 4:6 Page 16 of 16
Author details
1International Food Policy Research Institute, Markets, Trade and Institutions Division, 2033 K Street NW, Washington, DC
20006, USA. 2Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Department of Economics and Business, Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27, Barcelona
08005, Spain.
Received: 1 November 2014 Accepted: 4 March 2015
References
Angrist J, Pischke JS (2009) Mostly harmless econometrics, an empiricist’s Companion. Princeton University Press,
Princeton, New Jersey
Banerjee A, Duflo E, Quian N (2012) On the Road: Access to Transportation Infrastructure and Economic Growth in China”;
National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper N. 17897. Cambridge Massachusetts, March 2012
Beurmann D (2011) Telecommunication Technologies, Agricultural Profitability and Child Labor in Rural Peru”; Central
Bank of Peru, Working Paper Series, 2011–02. Lima, 2011
Beurmann D, McKelvey C, Sotelo C (2012) The Effects of Mobile Phone Infrastructure: Evidence from Rural Peru”; Central
Bank of Peru. Working Paper Series, 2012–12. Lima, 2012
Devoto F, Duflo E, Dupas P, Pariente W, Pons V (2012) Happiness on tap: piped water Adoption in Urban Morocco. Am
Econ J : Econ Policy 4:68–99
Dinkelman T (2011) The effects of rural electrification on employment: evidence from South Africa. Am Econ Rev
101:3078–3108
Escobal J (2005) The role of public infrastructure in market development in rural Peru. PhD Thesis, Wageningen
University, The Netherlands
Goyal A (2010) Information, Direct Access to Farmers, and Rural Market performance in Central India. Am Econ J: Appl
Econ 2:22–45
Grogan L, Sadanand A (2013) Rural electrification and employment in poor countries: evidence from Nicaragua. World
Dev Elsevier 43:252–265
Imbens GW,Wooldridge JM (2009) Recent developments in the Econometrics of program evaluation. J Econ Lit 47(1):5–86
Libscomb M, Mobarak AM, Barham T (2013) Development Effects of Electrification: Evidence from Topographic
Placement of Hydropower Plants in Brazil. Am Econ J: Appl Econ 5:200–231
Olken B (2009) Do television and radio destroy social capital? Evidence from Indonesian villages. Am Econ J: Appl Econ
1:1–33
Rud JP (2012) Electricity provision and industrial development: evidence from India. J Dev Econ 97:352–367
Sekhri S (2014) Wells, water, and welfare: the impact of access to groundwater on rural poverty and conflict. Am Econ J:
Appl Econ 6:76–102
Torero M, Álcazar L, Nakasone E (2007) Provision of Public Services and Welfare of the Poor: Learning from an Incomplete
396 Electricity Privatization Process in Rural Peru ”; IDB Working Paper N. 221, Washington DC, August 2007
Submit your manuscript to a 
journal and beneﬁ t from:
7 Convenient online submission
7 Rigorous peer review
7 Immediate publication on acceptance
7 Open access: articles freely available online
7 High visibility within the ﬁ eld
7 Retaining the copyright to your article
    Submit your next manuscript at 7 springeropen.com
